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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to combine two fi elds and show their essential connections. 
The concerned fi elds are the theory of design and the proper understanding of business ethics, especially 
entrepreneurship; both of them are Professor Wojciech Gasparski’s main areas of interest. This is a signifi cant 
and laudable project because in the modern world business is a key fi eld, yet it is not without its problems, 
especially ethical problems. Therefore, in the present context I see Gasparski to be an ethicist and axiologist who 
takes notions like responsibility and the satisfaction of human needs very seriously.
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Poglądy profesora Gasparskiego
na temat projektowania i przedsiębiorczości
Abstrakt. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest połączenie i pokazanie istotnych związków pomiędzy dwoma 
dziedzinami. Zarówno teoria projektowania oraz właściwie rozumiana etyka biznesu, skoncentrowana wokół 
przedsiębiorczości – o których tu mowa, stanowią przedmiot zainteresowania profesora Wojciecha Gasparskiego. 
Omawiane tu połączenie jest ważnym i godnym pochwały projektem, ponieważ we współczesnym świecie biznes 
jest jedną z kluczowych dziedzin ludzkiej aktywności, jednak niepozbawiony jest problemów, również natury 
etycznej. Zatem, w przedstawionym kontekście postrzegam Gasparskiego jako etyka i aksjologa, który traktuje 
takie pojęcia jak odpowiedzialność czy ludzki dobrobyt niezwykle poważnie.
Słowa kluczowe: projektowanie, etyka biznesu, Gasparski
Designs for a Better World
In this paper my purpose is to combine two fi elds, both of them are Professor 
Wojciech Gasparski’s main areas of interest, and show their essential connections, 
as he thinks of them. The fi elds are of course the theory of design and the proper 
understanding of business ethics, especially entrepreneurship. This is a signifi cant 
and laudable project because we know that in the modern world business is a key 
fi eld, yet it is not without its problems, especially ethical problems. Therefore, in 
the present context I see Gasparski to be an ethicist and axiologist who takes notions 
like responsibility and the satisfaction of human needs very seriously indeed. One 
may ask, why discuss business ethics at all if you do not take them seriously, in 
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the sense that you want to understand them and also apply this knowledge to real 
life problems.
Let me start by a quotation from an older paper by Gasparski and his co-authors, 
“Contemporary History of Design Science” (1983), which lays the foundation for 
his later work on the praxiological interpretation of business ethics. Gasparski 
et al. write as follows:
[T]he design activity links science to unifi ed practice in relation to a particular value system. 
Designing is also an area of confrontation between the rules that have been cognitively established 
and conventional rules of problem solution. Thus designing may be regarded as synthesis, as con-
frontation between “facts,” and “values,” between “what is” and “what ought to be,” between “the 
part” and “the whole,” between “the old” and “the new.” (Gasparski et al. 1983, 148).
Notice that design means a confrontation between facts and values, in the 
sense that facts form a static background that as such resists change, acting as 
a conservative factor, when values always imply a change in a better direction, or 
a better possible world. Here we can imagine two possible worlds, fi rst the actual 
world of facts where we happen to be now and then a better possible world where 
we want to be if we recognize a given set of values, or where we should be. We 
discuss here contingent facts that can be changed, that are malleable and vulnerable 
to change via intentional action. This is to say that we can, when our scientifi c 
understanding of the world is correct and our practical methods are effective, 
change the actual world so that it changes into something that resembles more 
closely the ideal possible world. We cannot realize the ideal world, that much is 
clear, but we can realize a possible world that is better than our present world and 
as such closer to the ideal world. As we know so well, values and ideals cannot be 
derived from facts alone and therefore we need much more than empirical science 
to determine what this better world is like and why it is better than the actual world. 
Moreover, we may be able to reach an agreement on facts even if it may not be 
easy, but in the case of values we may expect disagreement, quarrel, and even 
fi ght. Value descriptions and moral norms are too often essentially contested; yet, 
many of us are optimistic here as I think Gasparski is, too. Rational discussion on 
values and the characteristics of the possible world is possible and it can produce 
results. But this is a postulate only, a prescription of optimism, which we hope 
will ultimately lead us towards progress and a better world. Its opposite is not 
only pessimism but also cynicism that spells nothing but despair. In this way, 
we need design science that leads us towards the implementation of our plans on 
the basis of better values. One way to do this is business ethics. From a values 
point of view, it is not possible to design better business models independently of 
focusing on the role of business in the modern world, when we want to fashion 
a better world. In that case, the essential question is, what do we mean by better 
in this context? Gasparski has always emphasized the praxiological trinity of E’s, 
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effi ciency, effectiveness, and ethics. Here is a context where we need to combine all 
three always remembering that ethics comes fi rst. This has been called, in Kantian 
ethics, the overridingnes of duty, what is, ethical considerations come fi rst. It can 
also be applied to values by saying that you must plan your actions and realize your 
designs thinking of their consequences in terms of ethical values fi rst. Such values 
as aesthetics and hedonism come second even if in the ideal world all such values 
are exemplifi ed in unison. So, we need to add an obvious counterfactual restriction 
here, in the following way: If values cannot be realized together, you must start 
from ethical values – but without forgetting the rest of the value fi elds. Let us see 
how such preliminaries get implemented in Gasparski’s work on business ethics.
The Nihilistic Challenge to the Ethics of Entrepreneurship
In his paper “Entrepreneurship from a Praxiological Point of View” (2010), 
Gasparski applies and develops many of the themes of his earlier paper on the 
praxiology of design. I fi nd this long-term continuity a truly remarkable achievement 
in the sense that it tends to verify the existence the author’s dedicated and consistent 
train of thought and the continuity of his dynamic interests, or his defi ning mission 
in the fi eld of Polish praxiology.
Gasparski starts from an account of Ludwig von Mises’ praxiological account 
of business and entrepreneurship, as he sees it. What we have here is an essentially 
positivistic account of the fi eld of business, as it is easy to see. Gasparski rightly 
criticises this approach and by doing so cuts the connections of his type of 
praxiology to von Mises’ interpretation of the corresponding ideas. It must be 
said that these ideas are rather unsophisticated as such, especially because von 
Mises misses the role of values in practical life: he seems to think that some 
practical fi elds, like business, may exist such that they are on the other side of 
ethics altogether. Gasparski provides a nice analysis of this and contrasts his own, 
much more sophisticated ideas, to it. This is what von Mises says, according to 
Gasparski:
As far as the ethical aspect of entrepreneurship is concerned Mises points out that it is not the 
entrepreneurs’ fault that consumers, i.e. ordinary people, prefer alcohol to the Bible, detective no-
vels to the classics, and guns to butter. Entrepreneurs gain higher profi ts not because they sell “bad” 
things instead of “good” things. The higher their profi t, the better they are able to deliver products 
consumers want to buy with greater intensiveness […] It is not the entrepreneurs duty to encourage 
people to act better onto substitute ideologies with their opposites. That it is the duty of philosophers; 
they should change the ideas and ideals of human beings. An entrepreneur serves consumers such 
as they are, despite the fact that some of them are sinners and ignoramuses. (Gasparski 2010, 24)
I fi nd this almost shocking in its callousness and deliberate indifference to 
human values and progress towards a better world for all of us. Von Mises says 
people are what they are and business entrepreneurs serve them accordingly. I do 
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not think von Mises can say even this much without dismissing his value neutral 
point of view, that human beings are imperfect creatures who may want many evil 
things. He does not seem to be able to commit himself to an idea of bad or evil; on 
the contrary, he says something like this: If you think action A is bad or evil, it is 
the philosopher’s task of fi xing it. The emphasis is on “you think,” that is, on the 
subjectivist interpretation of value judgements. Values are always based on what 
you think. They have no essential connection to universalized normativity so that 
values would be action guiding to all people regardless of what they think. This is 
sometimes called value externalism, or values are not internally binding. The view 
that values are internally binding is called internalism.
A good example is Socrates and his analysis of values: If you know that 
A is good you necessarily recognize and respect A, only because it is good. The 
externalist position is Humean: you recognize and respect A, which is valuable, 
only because your relevant positive desires. Von Mises may even be interpreted 
as a value nihilist and as such as someone who is neither a values internalist nor 
externalist. For him, values simply do not matter. What matters is effi ciency which 
is measured in terms of profi t making and business success, if these two are not 
ultimately identical. He argues like this: Human beings are violent and therefore 
they need weapons against each other; businesses sell them weapons and make 
a maximal profi t out of it; this allows them to sell their weapons to people in 
a more intensive manner – if this does not sound cynical, what does? If you want 
to kill your neighbour, business sells you expensive weapons and uses the profi ts 
to sell you more expensive and effi cient weapons. The problem is, as it is easy 
to see, that selling poison and weapons all too effi ciently cannot be a sustainable 
strategy in the long run: all your customers will be dead sooner than later – as an 
entrepreneur you possibly cannot want that as it is not good for you future business. 
I have hard time understanding why von Mises does not see this elementary point 
about sustainable action strategies.
The real purport of ethical considerations is to see the problems of sustainability 
in the limelight of practical rationality. You need not say that your action is wrong 
or unethical, you may be suspicious of the meaning of such terms, but at least you 
should think of sustainability. Perhaps von Mises thinks, without really realizing 
it, that once the old customers’ killed by the weapons and poisoned by the ink, the 
entrepreneur moves over to another fi eld of business and starts working profi table 
havoc there. Of course we should be considerate concerning von Mises and his 
view. They are the products of the bygone era of positivism and positivism never 
found a way to handle the problems of ethics, duty, and values. This is their 
great failure, that is, they never saw that design science and business are both 
intrinsically value bound fi elds in such a way that to try to understand them without 
an ethical component must end up with a failure. It is as if you tried to justify 
the practice of business independently of values when all practice is essentially 
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guided by values. If there are no values, there is no practice; there is only causally 
determined instinctive behaviour.
Towards a Better Theory
Gasparski is fully aware of what is going wrong with von Mises’ praxiological 
account of business and business entrepreneurship. He writes: “It would be as simple 
as Mises writes if entrepreneurs were busy only with meeting consumer needs.” 
Then comes the critical point: “Today entrepreneurs are busy with innovations” 
and “creating consumers’ appetite for new needs.” But “creating needs is not an 
axiologically neutral” effort. “Entrepreneurs are becoming more responsible for 
good, which they produce and market.” The reasons, or at least a part of the 
reason, is that “they know better even than the consumer, the characteristics of 
the commodity they are offering.” Let us see fi rst how this line of criticism works 
and then we can go into Gasparski’s positive contribution to the ethics of business 
entrepreneurship; these two lines of though must be closely connected.
Let me now compare the ethical approaches of von Mises and Gasparski. Von 
Mises says,
 (M) Consumers know what they need and we sell them what they want; how 
could we be responsible?
Gasparski’s response is as follows,
 (G) We create new commodities that the consumer does not yet know and 
we make them need and want them; that is why we are responsible.
As I tried to explain above, the fi nal question in M elicits the response of 
disapproval and even blame: yes, you are responsible and accountable because 
you may sell people commodities that they really do not need or want; or, as it 
also happens, the consumers cannot see what these commodities do to them in the 
long run. The moral principle involved here can be formulated as a modifi cation 
of the Golden Rule: You only sell commodities you would want to use yourself, 
or let your children have. In this way we can see that there is no special business 
ethics – all ethics is one. The common rules of ethics apply in all fi elds of human 
practice in the same way.
Therefore, G is not really an ethical coup de grâce; instead, it is a reinforced 
and modernized moral argument against von Mises’ positivism and value nihilism. 
We also can say that it redirects the basic argument from omissions to actions, 
which makes G all the more convincing. My original argument against von Mises 
is founded on the moral relevance of omissions, which is fi ne if you happen to 
be a conscientious utilitarian, otherwise the moral status of omissions can be 
problematic. For instance, I said something like this, I sell you this, I know it 
kills you but that is not my concern. In other words, I let it happen that you kill 
yourself with the thing I sell you. In a sense, I am not involved otherwise than 
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through an omission. It seems my duty is not to sell it to you, which would be 
another omission. In fact, I fi rst act when I sell and then then I am guilty of an 
omission when I let the thing I sold you kill you. I could have prevented it, either 
via an initial omission (not to sell) or an active intervention (stop you from using 
it). Here the cynical question is: Why would I not sell it to you, if you think you 
need it and, therefore, you want to buy it? In this sense, strangely enough, my 
activity (selling) is at the same time the fatal omission that makes me vulnerable 
to the accusation of immorality. My morally relevant omission is nested within 
actionist context. My action entails the fatal moral omission.
With respect to G, the context now is fully and completely actionist, so to 
speak. The entrepreneur creates an invention, or a marketable commodity, that 
he sells to his consumers. We can distinguish several levels of action and activity 
here: fi rst, the creation of a new commodity, then creation of a new need whose 
satisfaction requires the new commodity, and, fi nally, a creation of a new customer. 
All this entails a sort of overkill: any one of the three listed types of action is 
a suffi cient condition of moral responsibility of the entrepreneur but now we have 
three of them. Gasparski and his G formulate such a strong case against positivistic 
value nihilism that no one can doubt or challenge it. G does not prove more than 
what can be derived from M alone but it does it in a way that must convince its 
intended audiences. It is an actionist argument that does not rely on the dubious 
notion of omission. In G, the entrepreneur is active all the way to the bitter end, 
namely, to her moral condemnation. He invents something that he subsequently 
develops into a marketable innovation. Here the emphasis is on marketability, 
which ever so subtly hints at value nihilism. The point is that we do not speak of 
usefulness, desirability, or satisfaction of needs – we only speak of marketability. 
Next, Gasparski makes it clear that new needs need to be created; this is the basis 
of marketing. The principle is this: If and only if an invention satisfi es a need 
is it marketable – if it is not marketable, do not try to market it. It follows that, 
sometimes, the entrepreneur must create new needs. Obviously, what he creates 
he is responsible for. This case is unlike the one where the need is old and well-
established; when I need and then buy, it is my own autonomous decision, as von 
Mises thinks.
Now, when I create a new need, for instance by advertising and other 
manipulative rhetorical trick, I mess with you inner life, your personal values, and 
private being. One can, of course, deny this by saying that if you adopt new values 
and new needs via advertising that is still your personal decision and responsibility 
– and hence G fails to convince us. The easiest way to shoot down such a bogus 
argument is to leave the suggested super-individualist perspective behind and focus 
on the statistics of mass behaviour, in the following way. It is a well-known fact 
that in a group people do things that no one in the group would like to do, if asked 
in isolation and individually. A group of men, as a group, attacks a woman but later 
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they all say, individually, I did not want it. The dynamism of a group is not the sum 
of individual wills – that much is clear through verifi ed empirical evidence. No 
positivist can deny it. Therefore, marketing may well work even if all individuals 
say they want to resist it and they are confi dent they can resist its effects. Once 
some small groups get infected, the epidemic spreads via imitation of desire, or 
mimesis if we use the term favoured by René Girard (1961). Soon we all want it and 
the commodity is marketable and possibly profi table as well. Then, as von Mises 
says, the profi ts can be directed to even more effective marketing procedures and 
methods. It seems unquestionable that creating new needs is, without exception, 
a source of full and undeniable moral responsibility. Mass marketing is too diffi cult 
to resist and reject by an individual.
Needs and Desires
Let us make a small digression towards a better understanding of some of 
the key psychological concepts here, that is, needs and desires. Gasparski says, 
“Creating needs is not axiologically neutral with respect to fulfi lling already existing 
needs.” (Gasparski 2010, 24)2 If I understand this correctly, he says need creation 
and need satisfaction have a different status, axiologically speaking. How do you 
create needs? I do not ask about the techniques of need creation, like advertising 
or propaganda, I mean psychologically. The fi rst step is to recognize the difference 
between needs and desires. This is not always done and the relevant difference is 
left implicit, as if it did not exist or the difference were largely insignifi cant and 
trivial. This is not true. The difference is real and radically important in the context 
we are interested in here. Let me explain: desires are propositional attitudes, just 
like beliefs, which are characterized by what is normally called their direction of fi t. 
If S desires X, this entails that her actual world would change so that X is present 
there. In this sense the world fi ts what S wants. In the case of beliefs, S’s relevant 
cognitive state should fi t the world, or be true of the world. In both cases the 
propositional content is the same, as it is in “I believe that X” and “I want that X,” 
only the direction of fi t is different. The second point is that desire is based on 
desirability, in the sense that if S desires X it logically follows that X is desirable. 
The third point is that desire is not a motive for action – in early literature desires 
were called a motive, but today most writers think it is a mistake. This is easy to 
see as follows: X may be desirable for S even if S does not desire it. Desirability 
is a necessary condition of desire as a mental episode; however, it is not its cause. 
We need more, like say an opportunity, moral clearance, and required resources. 
We learn not to desire many things we accept as desirable as such, like excessive 
search for pleasure vs. doing out duty. Once we actually desire, the background 
2 See also (Rescher 2014, 9).
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conditions are right. Then S is motivated to reach for X if the desire for X is 
actionist and the background conditions are right. For instance, the desire is “I want 
to go home,” where going home is action. Some desires are non-actionist, like 
“I want Manchester United to be the championship team.” In this case, my desire 
does not entail, or allow for, any action from my part (Airaksinen 2012; 2014).
Needs are different. If I say “I need coffee,” I may well add to it “I do not 
want coffee” without inconsistence or cognitive discrepancy. I need coffee to stay 
awake and I feel I must drink it even if I do not want coffee as such. What I want 
is to stay awake and in this situation coffee is understood as being instrumentally 
useful for this given purpose, staying awake. We often instrumentally need and use 
things we do not like or want as such – it is a sad truth about us and our world. 
Notice, if desire were a motive, we would have a problem here; however, desire 
is not a motive and hence no problem may exist. If “I do not want coffee” were 
a motive for avoidance of coffee, it would be problematic to say “I need coffee” 
in the sense that now I am willing to drink coffee to stay awake. In this case we 
would have a confl ict of motives, which we obviously do not have. We colloquially 
say, “I drink coffee now because it is the only way to stay awake.”
Now, how do we create new needs? Obviously we may create new desires 
which then necessitate new needs. How do we create new desires? Obviously we 
must prove to S that in her world there exist desirable things she has not recognized 
before, either because these things are novel or she has not paid attention to such 
things before. You have invented a new machine that creates new things. If I do 
not want those new things I do not need the machine, which brings about those 
things. So, I show you why the new things are desirable and then argue that the 
only way to get them is to buy my new machine. In many other cases the desire 
is old and the means to satisfy it are new. A new chemical has been developed 
that can be used as a recreational drug. Some people want to advertise it saying it 
brings about supreme pleasure with minimal harm to the user. The desire is already 
there, namely, desire for pleasure. The seller only must convince the prospective 
user that this new one is better that the old ones, or that the user needs this drug 
more than the old ones.
In this way, needs are always based on desires; if no desire exists also needs fail 
to emerge. Therefore, I say the key to need creation is manipulation of a person’s 
perceptions and judgements of desirability. Desirability judgements always are 
value judgements and, therefore, to manipulate them is to manipulate a person’s 
value system. Once this is done, new needs follow.
Suppose you tell me, “You want to be happy but it is impossible to be happy 
without X; therefore, you need X.” In such a case, once again, the desirable thing, 
happiness, is already given. Therefore, you only need to recommend X and you 
create a new need, a need for X. But notice that you may not like or desire X 
as such. On the contrary, you may fi nd it undesirable or even repulsive as such. 
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Now, from your marketing point of view, you need to make X look desirable. In 
the end, you hope that I desire happiness and because X is a means for reaching 
happiness I like X, too. This is to say I fi nd X desirable as such because it brings me 
happiness. You say I should love X, and then X is easy to market and sell to me. In 
sum: originally I found X undesirable or repulsive but you change my perception of 
X referring to the fact that I want happiness and X promotes happiness. Therefore, 
two ways to manipulate my values judgements exist: you change my ideas of 
desirability to create new needs or you change my evaluation of my old needs.
We see that creating new needs is not a trivial thing. You cannot create new 
needs without promoting something which, at the same time, means using value 
judgements in a manipulating way. I do not mean by manipulation a necessarily 
negative evaluation. I understand the concept in a neutral way so that some instances 
of manipulation are good and some are bad. However, manipulating other people’s 
values systems is a serious matter that always requires one to take responsibility 
for the effort. We know that people, especially collectively and en masse, are 
vulnerable when they are asked to change their values in a direction that is not to 
their own benefi t, especially in the long run. Therefore, von Mises’ approach to 
need manipulation and its value background is irresponsible. People may be able 
to resist such efforts, but whether they can or cannot is not really relevant here. 
What is relevant is that one tries to change people’s judgements of desirability in 
a certain direction without paying attention to their good. The problem is not only 
to create new desires and in their wake new needs but also to change the perception 
of things needed so that they start looking desirable as such. Think of cars, which 
are means of personal transportation but look like independently desirable objects 
to own. In this case means have become ends, or mere instruments have become 
independently desirable items. In our modern world, it is all too easy to confuse 
means and ends. We should not do that, so that any effort to encourage and promote 
such confusion is morally irresponsible. Yet, our modern culture of marketing rests 
on such confusion. Perhaps more serious problem is the creation of new desires, 
like air travel to distance places, which was promoted by airplane industry and 
then backed up by tourism industry – a clearly unsustainable development. Before 
the modern airplane, no one wanted to travel to the distant beaches of the Canary 
Islands. It is a new desire, although not many people actually desire the air travel 
part of the trip. The airlines try to convince people that fl ying is fun, but that kind 
of lie is unlikely to convince anybody – except if you have not fl own before.
Entrepreneurial Ethics as It Should Be
In the best possible world, what is entrepreneurial ethics like? This is to ask 
a question in an idealistic mood, but then normative ethics always contains such an 
aspect. Gasparski’s praxiology is ethically oriented and hence it is also idealistic. 
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There is nothing wrong with this, as long as we take care of not crossing some 
limits beyond which we become idle dreamers.
Gasparski discusses the ideal ethical aspects of entrepreneurship and refers to 
the great Polish philosopher Father Bochenski, as follows:
From the very structure of an enterprise there emerges the ideal entrepreneur, a person who serves 
the enterprise unselfi shly, even in opposition to others, if necessary. There are many examples of great 
entrepreneurs who uphold this ideal, concludes Bochenski. (Gasparski 2010, 25)
Regardless, or because, of the fact that I myself gave my fi rst ever university 
lecture course in Turku University in 1972 on Father Bochenski’s fi ne little book 
called Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden (1954), I fi nd this at the same time 
appealing and deeply problematic. It is true, as I see it, that entrepreneurship can be 
fully ethical and morally laudable even if it always has its problems. Think about 
the story of Kodak Company, the large American photo equipment producer and 
its great, genius founder George Eastman.
One can both like and dislike Eastman, a fi gure more complex and caring than the wooden 
character of the legend. His feisty business skills included industrial spying, the cornering all the 
signifi cant patents (except the primary one) and the squeezing out of competitors. But it is hard to 
fault his deep beliefs concerning the value of education, healthcare, racial and industrial relations, 
low-cost housing, and the importance to the human spirit of art, music, and designated parkland. 
(Brauer 1996, x)
His conduct was in a many ways laudable and even ideal but certainly not 
saintly; it also has its blemishes, for instance, the rumours of stealing the ideas of 
other inventors. All great inventors and entrepreneurs are like that, as it is easy to 
verify from history books and biographies – not autobiographies though. Perhaps 
inventor Nikola Tesla has some saintly features, but that is mainly because of his 
vulnerable character and tragic life (Cheney 2001). For instance, Tesla surrendered 
the contract on the rights of his greatest industrial invention, alternating current 
motor, to George Westinghouse for the false promise that Westinghouse will support 
Tesla in the future – an empty promise of course. The original contract between 
the men was forth millions and millions of dollar to Tesla and was too expensive 
from Westinghouse’s point of view. Tesla died in poverty, Westinghouse did not. 
This must be one of the most fantastic industrial frauds ever.
What I want to say here is that we can use the term “ideal” in two senses here. 
The fi rst one means something like as good as it gets or something you would want 
to imitate with clear conscience, perhaps not in all aspects but wherever it really 
matters. This use of “ideal” is common, like “He is my ideal player, I would like 
to be like him.” But then there is another idea of “ideal,” a kind of transcendental 
normative sense of the term, which entails perfection in any possible perspective 
and values system. Such perfection is for gods, it is the true ideal that we may try to 
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imitate but always without success. Yet it provides us with valuable guidelines and 
shows us the way, the Tao, that we should follows if we hope to be good persons. 
Perfection is the ideal we should aim at even if we never reach it. I know all of this 
sounds paradoxical but then we cannot help it; on the contrary, if our life, plans, 
and actions are not guided by ideals, we can never become what we potentially 
are, or as the age-old saying is “Become what you are.” Therefore, I cannot accept 
Bochenski’s idea of a Saint Entrepreneurship even if I accept the idea of an ideal 
entrepreneur in the limited sense of the word.
Gasparski is perfectly right when he calls for an ideal conduct in business; 
I agree with him. I also think he is right when he calls for grounding of ethics 
via praxiology and its three E’s. The point is as simple as it is valid, namely, the 
ideals of ethics or ideal ethics or ethical idealism generate too much hot air and 
not substance, if they are used in an unrealistic contexts. What we need is a bridge 
between ideal ethics and real life, or what should be and what is. It does not help 
much if we repeat what should be and what the ideal values are, if we do not say 
how to implement our ideas of good and right: “Cooperation between praxiology 
and ethics creates the conditions enabling good practice in economic life and outside 
it.” Notice, however, that the praxiological three E’s already mention ethics, so 
Gasparski must mean the two other E’s here, namely, effi ciency and effectiveness. 
Here is an additional interesting question, which I cannot discuss any further here 
but which might deserve our closer attention in the future: If praxiology builds 
a bridge between the ideal and the concrete ethics, what kind of ethics do we mean 
by the third praxiological E, or ethicality. Obviously, it cannot be what I have called 
ideal ethics; so what is this praxiological ethics? If it is applied or concrete ethics, 
why do we need a bridge from our ideals to the world where we live; we already 
have our concrete ethics?
Now, I do not want to discuss the E of effectiveness. We have much literature on 
that concept and its application for instance in economics. The question is, how do 
we use our scarce resources to the maximal effects? In philosophical ethics, John 
Rawls discusses such problems in his justly famous A Theory of Justice (1971). 
Notice by the way that effectiveness is a deeply normative notion because in the 
core of it is the demand that we should use our resources in a sustainable manner, 
or effectively. Yet, we do not discuss ethics here. We do not inquire into the good 
uses of our resources.
What about the second E, effi ciency? As I read it, the question concerns our 
ways and abilities to reach and realize the goals we set to ourselves. Again, this is 
not an ethical question because those ends can be mean and evil as well as laudable 
and good. But it is a normative E anyway. We should fi nd the ways of realizing 
our goals if we want to live a long and successful life. Again, we do not discuss 
morally normative questions here. Now, this is the point: because these two E’s 
are independent of ethics they can be used to build a bridge between ideal ethics 
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and real life. Their inherent normativity helps us here because now we are asked 
to apply ideal ethical consideration effectively and effi ciently to the hard reality 
where we live and which we want to make better.
Think of effectiveness. How could I live a good moral life if I am unable to realize 
my goals? I may know what is ideally good but that does not help if I do not make 
them part of my life as it is here and now. Many ideals are inapplicable in human 
life, so I must moderate and modify them as needed, and then I can successfully 
apply them. This is effectiveness in moral life. In fact such effectiveness constitutes 
moral life in this real world, which is full of compromises and negotiations anyway. 
To illustrate, some plans and courses of action are supererogatory in the following 
sense. They are good but they cannot be moral duties because such a duty would 
be too demanding. It is a mere ideal without proper applications in this world. 
I cannot have an unconditional duty to rescue because many rescue cases are too 
demanding. Suppose a house is burning and some people unknown to me are 
trapped inside. I could go to the door and open it but in that case I would get badly 
burned, as one can predict. It is good and admirable if I rush in; if I do not, no 
one can blame me with any justifi cation. The rescue action is supererogatory, in 
ethical terms. In the same way, in business a Saint Entrepreneur would sacrifi ce 
his whole business and all the workplaces of so many workers to save just one 
job. If he does, he fails in the effi ciency point of view and even his effectiveness 
is fl awed, but perhaps he did the ideally right thing. He says he is responsible for 
every worker as an individual so that many is not more valuable than one. Alas, 
we may not think he did the right thing.
Here is another problem case for us to consider: I know one of my products is 
defective in such a way that it will kill its user and the rest of the products are fi ne. 
I have no idea where the product is; should I recall all of them, which costs me lots 
of money and tends to ruin my reputation. This is not the case of supererogation 
for obvious reasons. I have a moral duty to recall the products regardless of the 
business consequences. It may even happen that the cost of the recall is more than 
paying compensation to the family of the victim of my faulty product. So, I have 
a fi nancial motive not to implement a full recall – but all that is morally callous. As 
we can see, considerations of the two E’s of praxiology are essentially important 
for practical and realistic business ethics, just as Gasparski argues. Ideals alone 
are not useful, considerations of usefulness are often straightforwardly callous, and 
therefore we need a third way out between the horns of this moral dilemma. We 
can get out by considering our laudable goals and how to realize them in real life 
(effectiveness), how to do it in a sustainable way (effectiveness), and considering 
what ethics demands from us. The point is, ethics should not demand so much 
that we never can be ethical. I think this is the true message of the last of the E’s, 
ethics. This is to say, against von Mises, that every entrepreneur should also be 
a philosopher who is able to understand where the limits of one’s responsibility 
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lie. Against Father Bochenski: we do not require that entrepreneurship be a saintly 
job; that would go against the rules of moral realism established via the idea of 
supererogatory plans and actions. It is enough to be a moral person who aims at 
sustainable goals and knows how to reach them in an effi cient manner. As I read 
it, this the message of Gasparski’s praxiologically oriented business ethics, which 
he recommends to be actualized in terms of the three E’s via good design practices.
In Sum: The key points of professor Gasparski’s philosophy and ethics are as 
follows; fi rst the problem, “The theory of designing social systems warns against 
ignoring the ethical dimension of entrepreneurship, and also highlighting the 
causes of methodological mistakes,” and then the solution, “Co-operation between 
praxiology and ethics creates the conditions enabling good practice in economic 
life and outside it.” (Gasparski 2010, 25 and 31)
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